A Temporary Accommodation Does Not Necessarily Make it a Reasonable Accommodation

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia recently granted employers a victory under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In Hancock v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., No. 10-CV-487 (RLW), 2014 WL 60288 (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 2014), the Court held that an employee who cannot perform an essential function of his or her job is not a qualified individual under the ADA, even if the employer previously chose to accommodate the employee by excusing the employee from performing the essential function.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia recently granted employers a victory under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In Hancock v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., No. 10-CV-487 (RLW), 2014 WL 60288 (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 2014), the Court held that an employee who cannot perform an essential function of his or her job is not a qualified individual under the ADA, even if the employer previously chose to accommodate the employee by excusing the employee from performing the essential function.

Selena Hancock (Hancock) was formerly employed as a medical assistant at the Washington Hospital Center (WHC). In March 2010, Hancock sued WHC, alleging that it failed to accommodate her disabling nerve conditions and wrongfully terminated her in violation of the ADA. A jury trial commenced on August 30, 2013. At the close of WHC’s case, Hancock moved for judgment as a matter of law on her failure-to-accommodate claim. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of WHC, the Court denied Hancock’s motion on the grounds that a reasonable juror could find in favor of WHC. Hancock then renewed her motion for judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, moved for a new trial.

Hancock contended that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her failure-to-accommodate claim because she proved that (1) she is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA and WHC had notice of her disability; (2) she is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA because she performed the essential functions of a medical assistant with an accommodation of no triage; (3) she requested light duty of no triage and no lifting over fifteen to twenty pounds as a reasonable accommodation; and (4) although WHC had previously granted the requested accommodation, WHC refused to continue to provide accommodation because it wanted Hancock to return to full duty, and ultimately terminated her.

WHC countered by arguing that (1) Hancock is not a qualified individual because she could not perform the essential function of triage; (2) Hancock failed to demonstrate that the requested accommodation was reasonable; and (3) WHC reasonably accommodated Hancock’s condition by allowing her to take a leave of absence.

The Court denied Hancock’s motion because it found that WHC had met its burden and that a reasonable jury could have (and did) agree that Hancock was not able to perform the essential functions of her job and that WHC did not waive that defense under the ADA. The Court explained that the ADA prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals on the basis of disability. It defines a qualified individual as “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” The ADA does not require an employer to reallocate essential functions in order to accommodate an employee’s disability. Generally, the question of what constitutes an essential function of a job is a factual issue to be determined by a jury.

The parties had stipulated that Hancock’s duties as a medical assistant included “registering patients, triaging patients, billing, and patient referrals, assisting nurses, cleaning exam rooms, stocking and ordering supplies, answering telephones.” The parties further stipulated that triaging patients, which entails “preparing patients to be seen by a physician, escorting patients to the exam room, and taking and recording patients’ information in their charts,” was an essential function of Hancock’s job. At trial, witnesses for both parties testified that Hancock was placed on modified duty and periodically excused from performing triage because her disability prevented her from lifting over twenty pounds and triaging patients. In other words, Hancock was unable to perform an essential function of her job, with or without accommodation.

Nevertheless, Hancock claimed that she was a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA because WHC had “waived” the essential function of triage by accommodating her request for modified duty with no triage for a period of time. Based on the same reasoning, Hancock also argued that WHC failed to reasonably accommodate her when it refused to continue to grant her request for light duty with no triage.

The Court disagreed and explained that merely because an employer voluntarily accommodates an employee’s disability by temporarily eliminating an essential function that does not mean the employer has irrevocably waived the essential function of the job defense to an ADA claim. Nor does it mean that an employee who is unable to perform an essential function of her job with or without accommodation is a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA. The Court explained that the case law on this issue overwhelmingly favors the view that an employee who cannot perform an essential function is not a qualified individual under the ADA, even if the employer previously chose to accommodate the employee by excusing the employee from performing the essential function.

Similarly, the Court held that an accommodation that eliminates an essential function of a job is unreasonable under the ADA, even if the employer voluntarily provided such an accommodation in the past. It was undisputed that triage was an essential function of Hancock’s position and that Hancock was medically restricted from performing triage due to her disability. Therefore, Hancock was not a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA and the requested accommodation of no triage was unreasonable.

The Hancock case highlights an important defense to ADA claims: that the employee cannot perform the essential functions of his or her job with or without reasonable accommodation. It also provides some comfort to employers that by granting a temporary accommodation, they are not necessarily acknowledging that it is a reasonable one. If you have any questions about this case or the ADA, please contact the authors or any other member of the Labor & Employment Group. 

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